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THE STATE OF UTAH
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF

MARRINER W. MERRILL FAMILY
FOUNDATION, INC.,

Plaintiff,
-vs.-

Civil No.
8192

THE STATE TAX COMMISSION
OF UTAH,

Defendant.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
The Tax Commission believes that the Statement of
Facts as set forth in plaintiff's brief is generally accurate
and conforms to our understanding and interpretation of
the Affidavit of Incorporation, the By~laws and the method
of doing business of this taxpayer. By way of clarification,
however, and in the hope of not being burdensomely repeti..tive, we would like to set forth in a cursory manner the
facts which substantiate and support the decision of the
Commission heretofore entered. They are as follows:
A. From the Affidavit of Incorporation the following
purposes are set forth:
1.

The investments and assets of the corporation
1
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are to be used "·for loaning or otherwise advancing
money and property." (T r. 24).
2. "For loaning or otherwise advancing money
and property . . . to any and all descendents . . . of
Marriner W. Merrill." (TR. . 24)
3. "To aid and assist financially in the training ol
any member of the family." (TR. .24)
B. The following methods and restrictions on con. .
ducting the business of the corporation are taken from
the By..-laws of the corporation:
I. "The Board of Directors is given the power
to loan or otherwise advance . . . funds for the accom. .
plishment of the purposes of the foundation." (Tr. 18).
2. ''Any member of the Marriner W. Merrill
family is entitled to borrow and receive from the foun . .
dation money as the Board of Directors may from time
to time prescribe." (Tr. 18).
C. Transcript testimony showed, and Mr. Merrill so
testified, that the Affidavit of Incorporation was broad
enough to permit the loaning of money to any descendent
of Marriner W. Merrill by blood or by marriage. {Tr. 10).
Mr. Merrill also testified that a donor or a member of
the corporation might have a loan made to such donor
and it would seem a fair inference to say that members of
the corporation could therefore receive any or all benefits
afforded by the corporation. (Tr. 10..-11).
We would like to draw the Court's attention, first, to
the fact that there is not one bit of evidence in the Affidavit
of Incorporation, in the By..-laws or in the testimony which
would indicate that the corporation has given away any...
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thing of value in the past, that it presently intends to give
anything away or that the board or any officer of the cor . .
poration has the power to give away any of the assets of
the corporation and, second, that there is no limitation or
definition upon the word "education" in any of the forma . .
tive documents of the corporation and it would therefore
appear that the board of directors has the exclusive and
sole power to determine the application of the word "edu . .
cation" in the operation of the business of the corporation.
It is, therefore, the position of the Commission that
this corporation is organized exclusively for the purpose
of making loans and receiving the increments therefrom in
the form of interest for the purpose of perpetuating the
economic level of a narrow, selfish and restricted group
and as such, it is a taxable entity in the state of Utah
for franchise tax purposes.

POINT I
IF THE MARRINER W. MERRILL FAMILY
FOUNDATION, INC. IS ORGANIZED AND OPER..
ATED FOR CHARITABLE PURPOSES, IT IS TAX. .
ABLE UNDER THE PROVISIONS OF THE COR..
PORATION FRANCHISE TAX ACT.
The plaintiff herein has argued extensively and per . .
suasively that a charitable institution is exempt from
taxation under the provisions of our act. We concur in
their reasoning and in the authorities which they have
cited, but we believe, and the evidence indicates, that the
Marriner W. Merrill Family Foundation, Inc. is not or . .
ganized for, nor intended to pursue, charitable activities
as the term is understood in Anglo . .Saxon Jurisprudence.
The plaintiff has attempted without reference to the facts
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of its operation but with extensive free use of authority
to show what is a charity. The oft. .quoted case of Bok
vs. McCaughn, 4 2 F 2d, 616, states in part that charity is
''whatever is given for the love of God or the love of your
neighbor in the catholic or universal sense, given from
these motives and to these ends free from the strain or
taint of every consideration that is personal, private or
selfish.'' This is the accepted definition of the term
"charity" as we understand the term and which has
been followed quite universally in construing acts similar
to the one here under consideration.
Conceding ·arguendo that the Marriner W. Merrill
Family Foundation, Inc. is a "charity" we believe that the
very testimony of one of the original incorporators who
conceived this organization removes it from exemption
under our act. You will recall that Section 59. . 13 . .4 ( 4)
provides in part that ''. . . no part of the net earnings
of which [the corporation] inure to the benefit of any
private shareholder or individual." Mr. Merrill, however,
has already testified that a donor of the corporation could
receive any of the benefits of such corporation. He, of
course, could not testify otherwise because the Affidavit
of Incorporation and the By. . laws of the corporation clearly
make the assets of the corporation and any increments
thereto available to any of the descendants of Marriner
W. Merrill. Obviously, and the affidavit so indicates, the
incorporators and the donors of this corporation are such
descendants and, consequently, any charitable function
engaged in or pursued by this corporation could inure
to the benefit of any or all of the private shareholders of
the corporation or other individuals or of the donors of
the fund created in the corporation. We are, of course,
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not concerned here as to what the corporation will or
won't do, but only what the corporation tan do by the
provisions of it's Affidavit-by the business purpose or
pursuit it is licensed or permitted by its franchise to do.
See American Investment Corporation v. State Tax Com-mission et al., 101 Utah 189, and 1938..-1 CB 168.
This situation, of course, that is, where the private
shareholders, individuals or donors of the alleged charitable
organization could receive the increments and benefits of
the funds, takes such organization out of the exempt
category it might otherwise be in. See Scholarship Endow-ment Foundation v. Nicholes, 106 Fed 2d 552. The
obvious purpose in forming this type of an institution is
to enable the donors to obtain a tax benefit and a deduc. .
tion on their personal tax returns from the contributions
made to the corporation which contributions if made
direct to the donors would not otherwise be deductible for
tax purposes. In other words, if the donors of the corpora. .
tion made loans directly to their sons, daughters, grand-sons, etc., such loans or gifts would not be deductible for
tax purposes for the very reason that they are of a private
and selfish nature. The founders of this corporation are
merely attempting to accomplish indirectly and by means
of the corporate veil and structure what they cannot do
directly-they are certainly not concerned with the $10.00
yearly tax paid to Utah-the state creating the entity.
We would like to repeat and emphasize that if the
plaintiff is a charitable organization, any of the participants
in the corporation by way of shareholders, individuals or
donors may receive any and all benefits from the corpora. .
tion and, consequently one of the primary requirements
set forth in the statute entitling the corporation to the
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privilege of exempt status for corporation franchise tax
purposes is not fulfilled or complied with.

POINT II
THE MARRINER W. MERRILL FAMILY FOUN-DATION, INC., IS A CORPORATION ORGANIZED
TO MAKE LOANS AND, THEREFORE, IS NOT
EXEMPT FROM THE PAYMENT OF THE COR-PORATION FRANCHISE TAX.
For a corporation to be exempt from the corporation
franchise tax of the state of Utah, such corporation must
be organized so as to fall under one of the subdivisions
of Section 59. . 13 . .4, Utah Code Annotated, 1953. The
taxpayer has contended that, in their instance, the follow . .
ing subsection ( 4) of the afore--cited statute is applicable:
"Corporations -and any community chest, fund or
foundation, organized and operated exclusively for
religious, charitable, scientific, literary or educa. .
tional purpose . . . no part of the net earnings of
which inures to the benefit of any private share-holder or individual" (see 59--13--4, U.C.A., 1953).
This statute requires that a corporation, to come with . .
in and be entitled to this exemption must, first, be or-ganized and operated exclusively for religious, charitable,
scientific, literary or educational purposes, and, second,
none of the net earnings can inure to the benefit of any
private shareholder or individual. To ascertain if this
corporation is organized pursuant to the foregoing pro. .
vision of our code, we must determine if the Affidavit of
Incorporation or the By. .}aws, as filed, so limit the opera-tion that the aforesaid requirements are met. See American
Investment Corp. vs. State Tax Comm. et al 101 Utah 189.
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Of course, it is well to note here that for a corporation to
be exempt from payment of the tax, it must clearly come
within the provisions of the statute as set forth, for such
exemption provisions are strictly construed against the
corporation. Norville vs. State Tax Comm. 98 Utah 170,
Equitable Life & Casualty vs. State Tax Comm. Utah
( 1952) , 112 ALR 1441.
The affidavit of the Marriner W. Merrill Family
Foundation, Inc., discloses that the corporation is organ-ized solely and exclusively for the following purposes and
with the following limitations on its method of conducting
its business:
a. The investments and assets of the corporation are
to be used for loaning or otherwise advancing money
and property.
b. To any and all descendants ... of Marriner W.
Merrill.
c. To aid and assist financially in the training of any
member of the family.
The By--laws provide for the administration of the
assets of the taxpayer for such loaning purposes under
the following restrictions and limitations:
a. The Board of Directors is given the power to loan
or otherwise advance . . . funds for the accomplish-ment of the purposes of the foundation.
b. Any member of the Marriner W. Merrill Family
is entitled to horrow and receive from the foundation
money as the Board of Directors may from time to
time prescribe.
To support the foregoing and 1n affirroance thereof,
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Mr. Merrill testined that the affidavit of incorporation
was broad enough to permit the loaning of money to any
descendant of Marriner W. Merrill by blood or by mar..
riage.
We believe that the foregoing purposes and methods of
operation of this corporation indicate clearly and with. .
out ambiguity that it is organized for one purpose, and
one purpose only, and that is to loan or to otherwise ad . .
vance money and property.
As such, and being confined to a method of operation
which prohibits it from divesting itself of its assets by any
method, we believe the corporation does not in substance
constitute a· corporation entitled to exemption under the
ordinary concepts applicable in such instance. Much has
been written on the equitable philosophy of exemption·
and it has appeared to us t~at the editors and writers on
the subject make a basic justification for such exemption
o~ the pr.et:nise and on the condition that such exemption
should be founded upon the general good which accrued
to the public as a whole; that such use or activity is one
which is· ordinarily engaged in by the sovereign or sub. .
stantially ·and realistically furthers the moral uplifting of
society, not in a selfish and restricted field, but in the
broad social sense.
The explanation of the basis of such exemption is
usually phrased as follows:
"One class of tax exemptions more or less uni. .
formly provided in the United States concerns
private agencies performing functions which in the
absence of such agencies would have to be under. .
taken by the public. The most common instance
of such private agencies performing public functions
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is charitable and educational institutions to some
extent health agencies, usually on a charitable basis,
are also involved. It is commonly accepted that if,
in the absence of a private enterprise, taxation
would be necessary in order to discharge a needed
function, the state may properly subsidize the In. .
stitution which performs the service. A common
method of subsidy is through tax exemption. (See
General Theory of Tax Exemption, by the Tax
Policy League, page 17).
The construction of the words of the statute should be
impressed with such a philosophy. The corporation here,
of course, is engaged only in loaning or otherwise advancing
mon~y or property. It is predicated upon the commercial
formula of investing capital and, realizing the ultimate re. .
turn thereof together with the increment of interest., The
foundation here does not give anything for the "Love of
Giving." This common formula and method of conducting
an enterprise certainly does not fall within the spirit
and intendment of exemptions from taxation as they are
understood under our law. On the contrary, the purpose
of this corporation smacks wholly of an enterprise pursued
with the selfish and private incentive of accumulating
money and property coupled with the economic and social
perpetuation of one individual's descendants.
Clearly, a loaning institution does not come within
the letter, spirit wording or clear intendment of the fore . .
going statute.
POINT III.
LIMITING THE LOANS OR ADVANCES OF THE
FOUNDATION FOR PURPOSES OF EDUCATION
DOES NOT MAKE THE CORPORATION ORGAN. .

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

10

IZED FOR EDUCATIONAL PURPOSES i\ND
THEREFORE IT IS NOT AN EXEMPT ORGAN,
IZATION UNDER THE PROVISIONS OF SECTION
59, 13,;4 ( 4), U. C. A., 1953.
As noted herein, the purpose of the Corporation is
to make loans and advances to descendants of Marriner
W. Merrill for educational purposes. Is the limitation
labeled "education" on the loans such as would allow
the exemption? We can find no precedents which would
in any manner support this position, and the Courts have
indicated that institutions claiming this exemption must
have as its primary and direct purpose "education." Let's
take first the citations given .by the taxpayer's counsel on
page 22 and page 23 of their memorandum. They are as
follows:
''A corporation organized to maintain a band for
giving free public concerts and the promotion of
musical art is exempt as an educational institution,
the terms not being confined to colleges and schools
(LT. 1475, 1,;2 C. B. 184). This bulletin of the In,
come Tax Division of the Internal Revenue Bureau
goes on to ·say that the fostering of an appreciation
or a desire of good music and of the promotion of
musical art are acually of an educational nature.
"An association organized and operated exclu. .
sively for giving musical concerts was exempt as
educational. (S.M. 1176, I.C.B. 147).
"The National Tax Association is exempt, being
organized and operated exclusively for scientific
and educational purposes (special rule, February
11, 1939, 393 C.C.H., Par. 6180).
"College students league, organized to bring
about an open...minded consideration of social, in. .
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dustrial, political and international questions, was
exempt as exclusively educational (1.1. 1224, 1. . 1
C. B. 256) ."
It is pertinent to note that every one of these organ . .
izations cited above actually participated and engaged in
"education" as such. The corporation, on the other hand,
does not itself participate in "education" and is not formed
for that purpose. It has been dedicated for the sole pur . .
pose of making loans so that descendants of Marriner W.
Merrill may attain higher education. All of the citations
we find are along the same vein-that is, the organization
itself, to qualify for an exemption for educational purposes,
has been actually engaged in the educational activitynot the remote purpose of making of loans so that certain
restricted persons could attain an education. It seems to
us that such loaning activity is too far removed from the
educational purpose contemplated by the statute and all
of the precedents we have read would certainly indicate
this distinction sound.
By way of further analogy, would a textbook manu..facturer be deemed organized for educational purposes?
It would seem that education in this instance would be
secondary and incidental. And the same would be true
of corporations organized to manufacture uniforms, sup..plies, desks and innumerable other items necessary and
essential to our educational system. Of course, such cor . .
porations would be organized for profit purposes and there-fore not exempt, but the point is, that the basic structure
is secondary to education and educational purposes. The
same is true of this Corporation, the main feature and
primary purpose being to provide a source of funds for
loans to enable the descendants of Marriner W. Merrill to
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seek higher education, not in the first instance for educa. .
tion as such. Another strong analogy would be that of
conforming the purpose of this business corporation to any
lending institution-that is-their primary purpose is to
make loans, while what the money is to be used for is
strictly secondary and incidental to the primary purpose
of making such loans.
It also seems to us that the fundamental principle on
which the right of exemption rests is not present herethat is, that the institution must be rendering an essential
service to the people of the commonwealth, thereby re..
lieving to that extent the charge on the general public.
See Layman Foundation vs. Louisville, 232 Ky. 259, 22
S.W.. (2nd) 622. Here, the Corporation is not relieving
to any extent a charge on the public by its making loans
to descendants of Marriner W. Merrill. We know of no
incident in history whereby any body politic has engaged
in the function of loaning money to any specific group for
educational purposes or even to the public as a whole for
such purposes. Consequently, and we emphasize, no public
purpose is here served by the Foundation's engaging in
the loaning business-but only the selfish benefits accruing
to the descendants of one person.
It should also be noted before passing this point, that
the assets of the Corporation are theoretically never ulti ..
mately consumed or used for the purpos~s of education or
charity or anything else. Its assets are merely loaned and
returned together with interest and, therefore, there can
never be a true beneficiary. of any of the assets, money or
property.
Therefore, by analogy and common logic, the founda. .
tion does not fulfill the requirement set forth in our act
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that the corporation be formed for "educational purposes''
to qualify for exemption.
POINT IV
THE CORPORATION "BENEFITS," IF LOANS
COULD BE CONSTRUED AS BENEFITS, ARE
AVAILABLE ONLY TO A PRIVATE, RESTRICTED
AND SELFISH GROUP AND, THEREFORE, THE
CORPORATION IS NOT AN EXEMPT ORGANIZA.TION.
As noted in the· Statement of Facts, the loans or ad . .
vances of the Corporation are available only to "any and
all descendants or husbands or wives of such descendants
of Marriner W. Merrill." The descendants of Marriner
W. Merrill, of course, are a limited group. The question
is, however, whether the group is so restricted and limited
as to remove it from an organization which furthers so-ciety and the public, as a group, rather than the uplifting of
the beneficiaries or members of the group as such members.
This issue is one of degree insofar as the restriction
or limitation of the group or the members of the organ-ization for exemption is concerned. (See Amy Hutchinson
Crellin vs. Commission, 46 B. T. A. 1152). The cases
which have been decided by the courts and the Board of
Tax Appeals on this point appear, on their own facts, to
be inconsistent and irreconcilable in the application of any
set rule. However, we believe that the inconsistency arises,
not by reason of the rule itself, but by reason of the equities
involved in the specific fact situation. In other words, the
courts do not defeat an organization from coming within
the exempt category merely by reason of the fact alone
that the benefits accruing from the organization pass to
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a restricted group, if a general public purpose is served.
For example, the authorities cited by the taxpayer show
generally that when the purposes of the corporation are
for "public charities" the "restricted group" doctrine is
given a broad interpretation.
On the other hand, there are cases in which the group
is so restricted that the organization is obviously organized
for private and restricted purposes, and in these instances,
regardless of the "charitable purpose," the courts have not
swayed in refusing the exemption. For in.stance, in the
Crellin case above cited, the trustor provided, among other
things, that the benefits of the trust could be received by
certain named grandnieces and grandnephews of the
trustor for educational purposes. The Board held that the
trust was not organized exclusively for public purposes and
the clause allowing for trust benefits to accrue to the desig..nated beneficiaries removed the organization from the
exempt category. A case which involved facts similar to
those here considered was treated by the Board in the
James Sprunt Benevolent Trust, 20 B.T.A. 19. In the
Sprunt case the organization was created to provide bene..fits for the support of those of the trustor's children and
descendants "who may be destitute" and the Board held
that this organization was created for a private, selfish and
restricted group and purpose and, therefore, did not come
within the rule as to public grouping and was not an ex..empt organization.
The taxpayer's counsel has cited the case of Emerit E.
Baker, Inc. 40 B.T.A. 555, in which case he contends the
Board granted exemption to a "restricted group." In the
Baker case a corporation was organized to provide annuity
payments to Baker's· widow and education expenses of
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certain designated relatives. In addition, however, broad
public purposes were outlined for the use of the funds in
the corporation for charitable and educational purposes.
The court held that these broad public purposes would
not be jeopardized by removing the corporation from its
tax exempt status merely by reason of the subsidiary and
incidental purposes of providing annuity payments to the
widow and educational payments to the relatives. We
respectfully submit to the court that if the Merrill corpora. .
tion had broad public purposes for charitable and educa. .
tional benefits accruing to an unrestricted group in addi . .
tion to the present benefits of loans to the relatives of
Marriner W. Merrill, the Baker case would be a precedent
to control in this situation. But the precise point upon
which the Baker case went before the court, that is, that
the benefits accruing to the restricted group of relatives
characterized the exempt status of the donor is the sole
purpose of this corporation and not an incidental pursuit
of broad public benefits. The court there stated:
"Trusts or corporations organized and operated for
the benefit of the donor's relatives or in general
for personal and private purposes, rather than for
public charities, are not within the statute. See
James Sprunt Benevolent Trust, Harry C. Dubois
31 B.T.A. 239."
It seems obvious that the facts in the Sprunt and
Baker cases, insofar as they pertain to the relationship
of the class benefited, and the facts here considered, are
identical and the obvious conclusion based on precedent
is that this corporation must be held to be an organiza. .
tion created for private rather than public purposes and,
therefore, is not exempt under the statute.
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REPLY TO THE ARGUMENT OF
THE PLAINTIFF
The taxpayer's brief is replete with cases and argu . .
ment which lends substance to exempting those organiza. .
tions devoted · to and dedicated for the moral, spiritual
and economic uplifting of that minority of society less for . .
tunate than those in the donative position. It is character..istic in a society based upon the principles of a republican
form of government that assistance, charity and love should
spring, not from the grace of the sovereign, but from the
love of a compassionate society. In such a public trust, and
founded upon these principles, organizations are relieved of
their right and responsibility of supporting through the pay. .
ment of their just proportion of the tax burden, those insti..tutions which create, protect and foster their existence. The
corporation here, we respectfully submit, has been con..ceived, is dedicated and is restricted to pursuing the purpose
of assuring and perpetuating the economic position of
the descendants of one individual. Our society has never
supported an exemption on this basis, nor should it support
it now. We would like to draw the attention of this Court
to the numerous citations set forth in plaintiff's brief with
the reminder to this Court that this corporation has never
even contemplaed divesting itself of its assets. Nothing is
given to even the descendants of the members, donors,
or shareholders of this corporation. Can thfs be said to
be, under these facts, a charitable institution? What does
this corporation give?
We believe that the substance of the argument is best
placed in its correct proportion if the corporation, as
such, is hypothetically removed from the argument, and
the question is then stated: Can an individual be declared
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to be exempt from the payment of taxes because he makes
loans to his relatives so they can attain and pursue a
higher education?
We respectfully submit that the decision of the State
Tax Commission, declaring that the Marriner W. Merrill
Family Foundation, Inc. is a corporation subject to the
payment of the franchise tax of the State of Utah, should
be affirmed.
Respectfully,

C. PRESTON ALLEN,
General Counsel.
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